Invest Better in Colgate
My name is Mark Sommer, Class of '82. I spent 27 years at Fidelity Investments, mostly as a fund manager. I want to draw your attention to serious concerns about Colgate’s endowment management. Colgate hasn't posted endowment performance on its website since 2021, leaving stakeholders in the dark about how their endowment is being managed. An independent source shows Colgate’s cumulative performance over the prior decade ranks 73rd of 119 large endowments ($1 billion or more) at the end of fiscal 2024. In 2025, Colgate quit the ranking service I used to track them. Colgate selectively published its 2025 return in their 2026 President's Report, from which I confirmed Colgate fell further into the bottom third of the short and long-term rankings. Colgate promotes a narrative of “conservative management” rather than addressing its dismal investment performance.
By contrast, Wesleyan University — similar to Colgate in size, mission, and historical investment approach — ranked 9th among the same 119 schools. Under Anne Martin (recruited from Yale, a pioneer in endowment management), Wesleyan’s endowment went from being $50 million smaller than Colgate's in 2015 to $300 million larger in 2025, a $350 million swing due primarily to superior investment performance! The top performers are dominated by universities that took endowment management seriously — like Wesleyan.
Put differently: investing, not just fundraising, materially determines what a university can afford. Both schools spend roughly 5% of endowment annually (~22% of operating spending). Had Colgate matched Wesleyan’s investment returns, it could have allocated roughly $15 million more in 2025 to scholarships and programs — an amount comparable to Colgate’s Total Annual Giving (President's Report, p.13).
Wesleyan shows what's possible when endowment management is done right: its ten-member professional investment team publishes a comprehensive annual letter detailing performance, including sub‑asset class returns, and publicly names its investment committee. Colgate, by contrast, rarely discloses anything about its investments or their performance and won't say who's on its investment committee. The bottom line: Colgate follows an alternatives‑heavy strategy lacking any demonstrated expertise, as their track record clearly shows. Here's the irony: a simple, low-cost indexing strategy would have put Colgate in the top quartile over the past decade.
Please join me in calling for better endowment management, disclosure, and governance. Fundraising alone is unlikely to close the growing endowment gaps with peers. Review the information below and sign the PETITION, joining over 30 of your fellow Colgate community members.
Colgate's Endowment Returns for 6 past years:
2020 4.2% Not reported
2021 35.8% Posted on website until 2025
2022 -3.5% Not reported
2023 3.6% Not reported
2024 7.3% Not reported
2025 9.7% Reported in President's Report Only
ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS
Performance:
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Colgate's average annual endowment return of 7.9% over the past decade ranks in the lower third of 123 large endowments (over $1 billion). Even in 2021, the one year Colgate chose to advertise on its website until July 2025, it ranked in the bottom half.
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A low-cost stock/bond index strategy would have put Colgate in the top quartile. Instead, nearly 70% of the endowment is invested in expensive alternative investments, managed by external firms. Selecting the best managers and negotiating lower fees requires expertise Colgate has not demonstrated.
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To be clear: I am not advocating that Colgate invest exclusively in the S&P 500, which has become heavily concentrated in a handful of stocks. Yet a well-constructed, low-cost, publicly-priced index strategy likely would have outperformed — and a thoughtfully chosen one is likely to going forward. The conditions that fueled many private investments earlier in the decade (low interest rates, less competition) has been changing. Without the expertise to navigate an increasingly competitive alternatives landscape, Colgate's approach is particularly risky. For a fuller discussion, see Paths Forward.
Misrepresentations:
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Colgate's primary argument against an index-based strategy, cited in the 2026 President's Report (p.27), relies on the 2000-2002 dot-com crash. They claim "the market declined by more than 50%," but that describes internet stocks, not the broad market. The S&P 500 — the index they're arguing against — declined 30% over that fiscal two-year period, and a stock/bond index only 15-20%. Not chasing speculative internet stocks in 1999 was a reasonable decision. But using an inaccurate, alarmist hypothetical from 25 years ago to justify last decade's poor investments, with different people managing in a completely different market environment?
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Colgate also claims, without evidence, that its lower returns reflect a desire to maximize risk-adjusted returns. This claim relies on the less-frequent price estimates of private assets, which artificially suppress reported volatility. (Fuller discussion)
Disclosure:
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Communication and disclosure are minimal and misleading. Colgate stopped posting endowment performance in 2021, will not disclose who serves on its investment committee, and withdrew from an independent ranking service I've been using to track their performance.
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The endowment's reported value may be overstated, as the valuations of most private investments are merely estimates.
Governance and conflicts:
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Many alternative managers sit on Colgate's board, which may present conflicts of interest. It is unclear whether Colgate has invested in funds or partnerships associated with committee or other board members. At least one prominent trustee involved in endowment decisions has a publicly documented track record of significant losses in funds he managed.
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Colgate claims its Audit, Legal Affairs, and Risk Management Committee enforces conflict-of-interest policies. But without disclosing investment committee members, their affiliations, or the identity of the endowment's investment managers, there is no way to evaluate whether this oversight is meaningful. I asked the CIO if the endowment owns investments managed by board members? No response.
WHY I AM ASKING FOR YOUR SUPPORT
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I have tried, unsuccessfully, to raise my concerns over a period of years, through the Development Office, CIO, President Casey, and the Board
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I now believe only our collective voice can persuade Colgate to improve endowment practices
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No matter how much you've given in the past, helping to improve endowment management could be the biggest financial impact you will ever have on Colgate
An alternative investment is a financial asset that doesn't fall into one of the conventional investment categories like stocks, bonds, and cash (or mutual funds so comprised). Alternative investments, laden with high management fees, include private equity, hedge funds, absolute return and real assets (e.g., real estate). They are privately held (not available to all investors) and may be valued by the investment manager that owns it (not by public markets or an independent pricing service). This valuation often relies on complex models, appraisals, or recent transaction data, and can be less frequent and more subjective than pricing for publicly traded assets.
Colgate
Colgate
Wesleyan
Wesleyan
Wesleyan
Colgate
ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS
Performance:
-
Colgate's average annual endowment return of 7.9% over the past decade ranks in the lower third of 123 large endowments (over $1 billion). Even in 2021, the one year Colgate chose to advertise on its website until July 2025, it ranked in the bottom half.
-
A low-cost stock/bond index strategy would have put Colgate in the top quartile. Instead, nearly 70% of the endowment is invested in expensive alternative investments, managed by external firms. Selecting the best managers and negotiating lower fees requires expertise Colgate has not demonstrated.
-
To be clear: I am not advocating that Colgate invest exclusively in the S&P 500, which has become heavily concentrated in a handful of stocks. Yet a well-constructed, low-cost, publicly-priced index strategy likely would have outperformed — and a thoughtfully chosen one is likely to going forward. The conditions that fueled many private investments earlier in the decade (low interest rates, less competition) has been changing. Without the expertise to navigate an increasingly competitive alternatives landscape, Colgate's approach is particularly risky. For a fuller discussion, see Paths Forward.
Misrepresentations:
-
Colgate's primary argument against an index-based strategy, cited in the 2026 President's Report (p.27), relies on the 2000-2002 dot-com crash. They claim "the market declined by more than 50%," but that describes internet stocks, not the broad market. The S&P 500 — the index they're arguing against — declined 30% over that fiscal two-year period, and a stock/bond index only 15-20%. Not chasing speculative internet stocks in 1999 was a reasonable decision. But using an inaccurate, alarmist hypothetical from 25 years ago to justify last decade's poor investments, with different people managing in a completely different market environment?
-
Colgate also claims, without evidence, that its lower returns reflect a desire to maximize risk-adjusted returns. This claim relies on the less-frequent price estimates of private assets, which artificially suppress reported volatility. (Fuller discussion)
Disclosure:
-
Communication and disclosure are minimal and misleading. Colgate stopped posting endowment performance in 2021, will not disclose who serves on its investment committee, and withdrew from an independent ranking service I've been using to track their performance.
-
The endowment's reported value may be overstated, as the valuations of most private investments are merely estimates.
Governance and conflicts:
-
Many alternative managers sit on Colgate's board, which may present conflicts of interest. It is unclear whether Colgate has invested in funds or partnerships associated with committee or other board members. At least one prominent trustee involved in endowment decisions has a publicly documented track record of significant losses in funds he managed.
-
Colgate claims its Audit, Legal Affairs, and Risk Management Committee enforces conflict-of-interest policies. But without disclosing investment committee members, their affiliations, or the identity of the endowment's investment managers, there is no way to evaluate whether this oversight is meaningful. I asked the CIO if the endowment owns investments managed by board members? No response.
WHY I AM ASKING FOR YOUR SUPPORT
-
I have tried, unsuccessfully, to raise my concerns over a period of years, through the Development Office, CIO, President Casey, and the Board
-
I now believe only our collective voice can persuade Colgate to improve endowment practices
-
No matter how much you've given in the past, helping to improve endowment management could be the biggest financial impact you will ever have on Colgate
An alternative investment is a financial asset that doesn't fall into one of the conventional investment categories like stocks, bonds, and cash (or mutual funds so comprised). Alternative investments, laden with high management fees, include private equity, hedge funds, absolute return and real assets (e.g., real estate). They are privately held (not available to all investors) and may be valued by the investment manager that owns it (not by public markets or an independent pricing service). This valuation often relies on complex models, appraisals, or recent transaction data, and can be less frequent and more subjective than pricing for publicly traded assets.
WE ARE PETITIONING FOR
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Disclosure of managers’ rankings in their respective markets, showing Colgate’s skill at hiring investment managers
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Annual performance updates, including long-term performance ranking relative to an appropriate peer group ($1B+ peers) and benchmark
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Disclosure of managers and their fees
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Regular independent (non-CIO and Investment Committee) assessments of performance and benchmark
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Course corrections when long-term performance is poor, potentially transitioning to an inexpensive, passive indexing strategy.
Please join me in asking for more transparency and accountability.